This past weekend, in a post announcing his selection of PayPal and Founders Fund co-founder Ken Howery for Ambassador to Denmark, Donald Trump stated that “the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.” While outlandish, the idea of annexing Greenland is nothing new for Trump. In 2019, the then-President floated the idea of purchasing the territory from Denmark, calling it (naturally) a “large real estate deal.” Excoriating the notion as “absurd,” Danish officials levied accusations of toxic neo-colonialism. (Trump’s decision to respond with an image of his 64-story Las Vegas hotel photoshopped onto a Greenlandic coastal village probably didn’t help.)

The reality, however, is that — inadvertently or not — Trump put his finger on a serious opportunity with potentially profound upside for the US, Greenland, and even Denmark. The increasing geopolitical importance of the Arctic, which, on account of emerging new trade routes, military competition, and a fight for invaluable natural resources like rare earth elements (REEs), is now the backdrop for growing tensions with China and Russia. Projecting American power into the next century requires proactive strategic investment anchored in the kind of Arctic expansion that a Greenland deal could provide.

The recent surge of interest in Greenland stems in part from climate change: as the polar ice caps melt, the opening of new oceanic trade routes presents unprecedented modern opportunities for the shifting of sea transport. Mike Pompeo made the claim in 2019 (perhaps overzealously) that Arctic sea lanes could “become the 21st century Suez and Panama Canals.”

But there’s an even more fundamental question of national security. Military presence in the Arctic is essential for drone-led surveillance and the early detection of ICBMs, as the shortest missile routes often cross over the region. For this reason, Thule Air Base, recently renamed “Pituffik Space Base,” hosts a BMEWS installation (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System). That system was last upgraded in 2017, and while nearly $4 billion of new spending has been approved for the base, military upgrades are explicitly disallowed in the budget scope. Putting significant military trust in Canada, our northern and principally Arctic ally, is a potentially tenuous call: they have not even met NATO’s two percent defense-spending requirement (and do not plan to until 2032). Greenland itself, part of NATO via its association with Denmark, has reportedly become more aligned with the West and concerned about Russian influence in Europe after the recent invasion of Ukraine.

These factors are compounded by Greenland’s rich bed of natural resources. Its graphite deposits, roughly six megatons, as well as its uranium, rare earth elements, and potential oil and gas reserves, may be critical to reducing reliance on Chinese supply chains. China’s near-monopoly on gallium, graphite, and other REEs presents a challenge for the United States as it looks to assert its self-sufficiency: the US maintains that there are fifty “critical minerals,” most of which are supplied by China (who just banned their export to America). Greenland’s Ilimaussaq intrusion alone has thirty.

While America does have an abundance of most REEs, and is limited more by regulatory barriers to refining than geographical access, certain in-demand materials (the US has less than 1% of the world’s graphite reserves) are unlikely to shed import reliance. In addition to housing two of the ten largest REE deposits in the world, many of Greenland’s reserves are also higher-grade than those in the US and contain high concentrations of valuable heavy rare earth elements (HREEs).

But with just 57,000 people, the territory currently lacks the capabilities needed to extract these resources. The harsh climate and lack of economic diversification — fishing and Danish subsidies account for around 60% of the territory’s GDP — mean that industrial infrastructure for activities like mining is scarce, though some American and Australian firms are starting to enter the market. The political and ecological hurdles involved, however, are nontrivial — co-located Uranium mining in the territory was ground to a halt in 2021 through the influence of the environmentally conscious Inuit Ataqatigiit political party — and the refining of extracted REEs is unlikely to occur on Greenlandic soil (a problem more likely solved in the US or via Latin American intermediaries).

Interest on the part of America’s two leading adversaries has only grown since the end of the Cold War. In 1996, world powers forged the Arctic Council as a diplomatic vehicle to establish new footholds in the region. Today, China considers itself a “near-Arctic state,” while Russia continues to construct bases and make further Arctic territorial claims. China has made clear its intentions to build a Polar Silk Road and, in September 2024, China and Russia met in Beijing to form a “comprehensive strategic partnership” for the further leveraging of the Northern Sea Route and broader cooperation in the Arctic.

--

--

For its own part, the United States has been fundamentally tied to the Arctic since its acquisition of Alaska, and American interest in acquiring Greenland is certainly nothing new. The first serious considerations date back to 1867, the same year Andrew Johnson’s Secretary of State William H. Seward successfully facilitated the purchase of Alaska from the Russian Empire for $7.2 million (roughly $154 million in today’s money). Now viewed as a masterclass in statesmanship, the move was ridiculed at the time as “Seward’s Folly.” Seward simultaneously explored the acquisition of Greenland (and Iceland), but he fell short of his land-purchase hat trick. Since then, a number of overtures have been made — including talks with Denmark in 1910 and a rejected 1946 offer of $100 million in gold bullion (worth about $7 billion today) — but the territory has remained under the Danish umbrella.

Greenland has been trending toward independence for years, something that complicates modern American involvement. It was only in 1953 that, upon a change in the Danish Constitution, Greenland transitioned away from being a colony and became a part of Denmark (residents were granted Danish citizenship and parliamentary representation; they currently hold two seats). This was the first step in a continuing move away from external control and toward full sovereignty. Greenland established “home rule” in 1979, which gave them jurisdiction over a broader range of domestic affairs, and progressed to full “self-rule” via the 2009 Self-Government Act, which is also the piece of legislation that would theoretically allow them to declare independence. Today, Denmark is responsible only for the defense, foreign affairs, and monetary policy of Greenland, though the territory now has some jurisdiction even in those areas.

In fact, in 2023, Greenland drafted a first version of its constitution, and its new 2024 National Security Strategy explicitly cites the territory’s goal of independence. Additionally, the now-dominant Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party, having surpassed the Siumut party in the 2021 election, holds the pursuit of independence as one of its core tenets. Cultural tensions between Greenland and Denmark also contribute to independence calls, with emblematic incidents of parliament members refusing to speak Danish and instead giving speeches only in Greenlandic. In a June 2024 interview, Aki-Matilda Høegh-Dam, one of the two Greenlandic members of Denmark’s parliament, said, “[T]he word ‘independence’ isn't suitable for a world where we are all interconnected… however, we want to create a state in which Greenland has authority over, for example, foreign policy, which we would never have if we weren't a state.” In October of this year, the US and Greenland, with Denmark third-wheeling, released a joint statement committing to deeper involvement on many of the issues previously noted in this piece.

While an outright purchase of the territory would be politically difficult, this is by no means a binary situation. The US has a number of pathways it can explore to bypass these obstacles and achieve the benefits of full acquisition without many of the downsides. From granting citizenship and increasing cross-cultural exchange to providing targeted economic support, there are meaningful steps the US can take to simultaneously bolster America’s position and unlock Greenland’s full potential.

This year, three former senior US officials examined the potential for a COFA-like agreement which would exchange economic support and immigration benefits from the US for exclusive military access in Greenland. COFAs (Compacts of Free Association) are currently in place between the United States and the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. These agreements contain military, economic, and immigration clauses that end up being mutually beneficial: the nations remain fully sovereign, they are defended by (and can serve in) the US military, their citizens can live and work freely in the United States without a visa, and they receive targeted economic subsidies for key infrastructure and longevity-related initiatives.

Another key element of COFAs is their lease-like structure: they are typically around twenty years in length and get extended via mutual agreement. Establishing this sort of arrangement with Greenland would allow them to pursue greater independence as a sovereign state while still reaping all of the benefits that come from a tight-knit association with the United States. The lack of permanence may also help to alleviate indigenous concerns of American imperialism.

While it is true that the United States already has a key base (Pituffik) in Greenland via an agreement with Denmark, a COFA-like situation could remove restrictions on the expansion of existing bases and the construction of new ones. Currently, all approvals need to go through both the Danish and Greenlandic governments, which creates a bureaucratic and somewhat unclear three-way process. The investment and migrational elements of the COFA would also put the United States — and American businesses — at an advantage when it comes to natural resource access, as subsidies would likely lessen the burden of infrastructure-related startup costs.

The United States could also work to establish an American presence in the Greenlandic population. Nick Solheim, founder of American Moment and The Wallace Institute for Arctic Security, has spoken at length about the United States’ relationship with Greenland and the potential avenues through which we could create a tighter partnership. At the most recent Hereticon, he referenced the use of a new Homestead Act to encourage cross-settlement between America and Greenland as an initial step toward expansion.

The original Homestead Act, signed into law by Abraham Lincoln in 1862, gave land claims to US citizens in exchange for long-term settlement and cultivation. Relevantly, this policy was in effect in Alaska until 1986. If fair deals could be made, and Greenlandic fears of neo-colonialism assuaged, this is an approach that could potentially be implemented in tandem with COFA-type proposals. Incentivizing American-Greenlandic cross-pollination through the movement of people and resources could have powerful economic and cultural impacts long term. This, in turn, could open the door to deeper cooperation.

While it is true that Denmark’s consent is required for Greenland to make key foreign policy moves, if those moves are judged to impact Denmark in any meaningful way, there are a number of mitigating factors. First, Denmark and the United States are allies and have a history of productive collaboration in the region. The agreement which sanctions Pituffik Space Base, for example, is primarily between the US and Denmark. Further, in 2018, Denmark agreed to intervene at the suggestion of the Pentagon to block the construction of airports by a state-owned Chinese company after Greenland had independently approved the project. Second, Denmark spends roughly $600 million of its annual public budget on subsidies for Greenland; a relief of this burden would free up nontrivial funds for domestic use. And while Denmark recorded a budget surplus of 3.1% of GDP in 2023, projected increases in spending (notably, on defense) will see that number dwindle to an estimated 0.7% in 2025. The Danish are keenly aware of how critical the United States is to their national security, both indirectly via NATO funding and directly via agreements like the 2023 DCA.

What if Denmark stood fast on its refusal to allow increased US participation in Greenland’s affairs? Greenland could theoretically declare preemptive independence via public referendum and make deals with the United States without Danish approval, but this may create undue stress between all three of the parties involved and is probably a sub-optimally hostile approach. Practically speaking, finding a way for the arrangement to benefit Denmark is an important element of striking this deal; America does not want to be seen forcing the hand of an ally.

While calls to “buy” Greenland may come across as outlandish, they highlight a critical reality: the United States cannot afford to be passive about its Arctic strategy. Russia and China are aggressively pursuing dominance in the region, and the West must respond in kind to protect its trade, defense, and resource interests. Expansion does not need to be an ugly relic of the past; creative diplomatic solutions can mutually benefit America, Greenland, and Denmark, transforming the “absurd” into a model for productive 21st century international cooperation.

—G.B. Rango